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Economics has been criticized by other disciplines, and by some prominent economists
themselves, for many of its methodological choices, in particular the specific assump-
tions in models. Some of these critiques have been appropriated by economists, giv-
ing rise to new sub-fields of economics. Critics from the field of history and sociology
have long pointed out that the economic models of markets are not historically and
institutionally embodied, as the real markets are. Various strands of institutional
economics arose from such criticism. Claims by ecologists that natural capital is
not completely substitutable with other forms of capital fostered the development
of ecological economics. Likewise, criticism from psychologists that decision makers
are irrational or boundedly rational foster the development of behavioral economics.
This chapter concerns another example of persistent criticism, namely the assump-
tion in economics that homo economicus is an asocial animal, which does not hold on
evolutionary, psychological or sociological grounds. How have economists responded
to this criticism, and how successful have they been?
To focus the discussion, I will review four strategies of model modification that
aim to address the sociality of human behavior and interactions in the framework
of rational choice. In particular, I will focus on modifications of game theory, which
is the main analytical tool economists use to model interdependent choices. The
perspective I adopt here reflects mainstream approaches to economic modeling, and
I do not discuss more radical proposals to use entirely new frameworks such as com-
plexity theory or network theory (see e.g. Mason et al., 2007). This focus on the
mainstream approaches is motivated as a useful way to highlight core character-
istics of economic explanations of sociality. The review of four major approaches
to modeling social influence in economics will indicate different interpretations of
sociality, followed by a suggestion that the non-reductive and constructive interpre-
tation brings economics closer to sociology and away from psychology and biology.
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The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, in order to make explicit
the explanatory core of economic models, I present a broad categorization of expla-
nations of human cooperation, building on Calcott (2013), and specify the category
in which economic explanations fall. After that, I describe in some detail four types
of responses to the question of asociality. In section 4, I discuss two methodolog-
ical issues. The first concerns disagreements about what these models are models
of, which reflects the core explanatory interests of economics discussed in Section
2, and the second type concerns the practical use of alternative models of socially
influenced behavior. Section 5 concludes the chapter.
2 Explanations of social behavior: carving the do-
main of economics
To discuss the domain of economics, at least two approaches are possible. One is
to start from the debates about the proper explanandum of economics, e.g. whether
it should explain market phenomena narrowly following Coase or social phenom-
ena more broadly following Becker (Hsiung, 2001). The other approach, which I
adopt here, is to focus on explanans, namely types of explanations and identify core
features of economic explanations in contrast to other types. Let us focus on the
observation of pro-social human behavior broadly construed, which is an uncontro-
versially important explanandum of economics. There are many factors contributing
to human cooperation on different levels from the neural and the cognitive to the
affective and the social. The standard explanatory division of labor distinguishes the
proximate from the ultimate causes of human sociality in pro-social or cooperative
behavior (Mayr, 1961). The proximate cause is associated with the psychological
mechanism of social behavior, and the ultimate cause with the evolutionary dynam-
ics that give rise to such behavior. In this sense, the division appears to be between
psychology and biology, and there is no place for economics. However, I will show
that the proximate-ultimate dichotomy is a good starting point to understand dis-
tinct features of economic explanations, drawing on Calcott’s (2013) modification of
the dichotomy.
In the context of non-human cooperation in biology, Calcott (2013) criticizes
this dichotomy for obscuring two distinct dimensions along which different types
of explanations can be distinguished.1 The first dimension is temporal. Proximate
explanations refer to mechanisms, typically psychological, that support currently
observed cooperative behavior such as a sense of duty and sympathy. Referring to
these mechanisms, however real they may be, does not explain how it was possible for
1In what follows I only discuss human cooperation, although the scope of Calcott’s discussion
is wider.
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them to evolve, given the background knowledge that cooperative behavior does not
always enhance individual fitness. To address this explanatory demand, one needs
to turn to evolutionary explanations that explicitly model population dynamics over
an evolutionarily relevant period of time, such as gene-culture co-evolution, group-
selection, and so on. In other words, this type of explanation addresses the historical
or evolutionary origins of the explananda.
These two types of explanation also differ along another dimension, the spatial
scale of resolution. Whereas proximate explanations focus on mechanisms operating
on the individual (organism) level, ultimate explanations model the interactions of
individuals an the population (organization) level (see Table 1).
Table 1: Two dimensions of the proximate-ultimate distinction. Reproduced from
Calcott (2013, 253)
Current Operation Historical Origins
Individual Mechanisms Proximate explanation Lineage explanation
Population Dynamics ? Ultimate explanation
Calcott’s main purpose in disentangling these temporal and spatial dimensions of
the proximate-ultimate distinction is to highlight the distinct third category, which
he calls lineage explanations. Such explanations focus on historically long periods of
time, such as the evolution of the vertebrate eye or the shape of a feather. Keeping
natural selection on the population level as a background assumption, they show
how step-by-step variation can produce a complex camera eye from a simple eye
spot, for example. The focus is on the individual, but the time span is evolutionary,
a continuous trajectory of change over time. The explanatory interest lies in how
new, complex capacities or forms were able to emerge from pre-existing and rela-
tively simple forms. Calcott goes on to argue that the complex cooperative patterns
of organizations also call for lineage explanations. He provides a few examples of
biological cooperation for which lineage explanations are needed, such as the coop-
erative nest-building of green tree ants, team hunting by mammals, and the internal
organization of differentiated cells into a useful structure. All of these examples
involve a complex division of labour and the organization of different roles into a
new function.
Analogous explanations abound in history and the social sciences. Although
the focus is on social and institutional rather than biological organizations, and the
temporal scale is human historical rather than evolutionary, Max Weber’s idea that
the roots of modern capitalism lie in Protestant ethics, or rather in law (Tigar and
Levy, 1977), fall into this type of the new-from-old explanation. The explanation
of societal transitions lie in the re-deployment of existing institutions, values, norms
and so on for new purposes.
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What is peculiar about Calcott’s table, however, is that the box corresponding
to current operation/population-dynamics is left empty. This is presumably because
population dynamics in biology refer to the dynamics of natural selection over an
evolutionary temporal scale. However, just as lineage explanations correspond to
specific explanatory interests in mechanistic step-by-step changes through variations
in some feature of an organism on the individual level, there is an explanatory
interest in the current operation of some feature on the aggregate level. In contrast to
population dynamics, the focus is on the current operation of some causal processes
that give rise to a phenomenon that is being observed; and in contrast to individual
mechanisms, the focus is on patterns of interaction among individuals.
My suggestion is that economic explanations typically fall into this category. For
example, economic explanations of cooperation (or the lack thereof) keep individual
mental operations as background assumptions and model current operations as the
aggregate result of the interactions of individuals.
In particular, equilibrium explanations that are typical of microeconomics satisfy
the conditions of being population-level and a-temporal (non-dynamic). If this is the
typical mode of economic explanations, many of the idealizations economists deploy
in their modeling make a lot of methodological sense. The assumption that individ-
ual actors have narrow self-interests, for example, is merely a background condition
that fixes one parameter to see how their interactions give rise to population-level
phenomena. Similarly, the assumption that all individuals are the same, whether
selfish or not, is an idealization that helps focus on population-level interactions. In
fact, as I will show in the next section, most well-known models of social prefer-
ences could be interpreted as adjustments of background assumptions, keeping the
core explanatory device of equilibrium analysis unchanged. Moreover, this four-fold
scheme enables us to highlight the novelty of more recent models of social behavior,
while at the same time showing them as distinctly economic.
3 Models of socially influenced behavior
Let us come back to the criticism that homo economicus is asocial, and the re-
sponses to it. Some influential models of pro-social behavior appeared already in
the 1980s, including those of Gary Becker and Robert Sugden. This suggests that on
the methodological level it was relatively straightforward to include other-regarding
preferences as an independent variable of the decision maker’s utility function. How-
ever, empirical evidence of pro-social behavior for these models was in the form of
aggregate observational data, making their empirical evaluation somewhat compli-
cated.
The literature on social preferences exploded after the invention of a series of
two-person games, namely the ultimatum game, the dictator game and the trust
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game (Camerer, 2003), which encouraged economists to propose a variety of models
of social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993) and their systematic
empirical evaluation.
One way of categorizing different models of social behavior is to distinguish
between models of preferences and models of beliefs or reasoning. I will follow this
strategy, although some models do not fit in this dichotomy, nor it is clear that
economists are committed to belief-desire psychology, as we will see below.
Two separate assumptions in models of preferences are targeted by critics. The
first is that people are selfish, or in more neutral language, self-regarding, meaning
that they care only about their own payoffs. The second is that people’s preferences
are independent of each other. These are, in fact, distinct points, which have been
addressed by distinct models. The other set of criticisms concerns strategic ratio-
nality, in particular best-reply reasoning as an inaccurate description of how people
reason in interdependent situations (Section 3.2).
3.1 Preference-focused approaches
Given the methodological analysis of explanatory styles and corresponding modeling
strategies across disciplines, it is unsurprising that the first response of economists
was to modify the selfishness assumption, as shown in Equation 1.2
Ui = f(xi) (1)
where Ui is the utility function of individual i, and xi is the payoff,
3 and f is
some monotonically increasing function. It is unsurprising because such an assump-
tion is simply a background assumption that is not essential to the core explanatory
project. There are good overviews of this literature available (e.g. Dhami, 2016;
Camerer, 2003), so I will keep my presentation here brief and schematic. In partic-
ular, I will not engage in systematic evaluations of the empirical success of different
models against the data from a range of experimental games. My aim is rather to
highlight the differences in approach to issues of socially influenced behavior from a
methodological perspective.
The first knee-jerk reaction of economists to the criticism that people are not
selfish is to propose altruism as an alternative motivation. This approach is intuitive
because the contrast target is egoism or selfishness. It is also natural, because the
salient phenomenon to be explained is the field observation that many public goods
are financed through private contributions to charities such as the Red Cross. People
2It even precedes the explosion of the social-preference models after the invention of the utli-
matum (Güth et al., 1982) and dictator (Kahneman et al., 1986) games. See e.g. Becker (1974).
3In what follows, I use the term payoff, although terms such as consumption and income are
used variably in economics, depending on the context.
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privately contribute to the public goods through charitable giving, which is a puzzle
that the simple assumption of selfishness cannot explain.4 Two types of altruism
have been distinguished: one is pure and the other is impure, also known as ‘warm
glow’ altruism (Andreoni, 1990). Both are described as the following utility function:






G is the total amount of public good and gi is i’s contribution. A model of pure
altruism does not contain gi in the utility function: the agent cares only about private
income (xi) and the total amount of public good. In contrast, impure altruists also
care about how much they contributes to the public good as such, independently of
how that contributes to the total public good. In the extreme case G is removed
from the model, making the altruist completely egoistic (in the sense of caring only
about his or her own altruistic act regardless of its impact on the public good).
The model of impure altruism is introduced to account for several stylized ob-
servations that models of pure altruism cannot explain, such as the fact that gov-
ernment grants do not crowd out private giving.5 Although this model has been
fairly popular in economics, it is not considered ‘modern’, partly because it is some
kind of regress to egoism in introducing more self-regarding preference to account
for prosocial behavior.
Many of what Camerer (2003, 101) calls modern theories, in contrast, ‘substitute
a social utility for a vector of payoffs.’ In other words, what people care about is their
relative as well as absolute payoffs. This methodological choice allows economists
to model the psychological mechanism of interpersonal comparison based on some
notion of fairness, as a main channel through which social influences modify indi-
vidual behavior. Significantly, a range of two-person experimental games enabled
the operationalization of interpersonal comparison, as opposed to focusing on the
aggregate of G or one’s contribution gi. The most well known of these is a model
of inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), which includes the difference (both
positive and negative) between i ’s and the reference person j ’s income as sources of
4Because most experimental subjects in a neutrally framed public-good game turn out to be
either unconditionally selfish or conditionally cooperative, one might think that economists have
poor psychological intuition. However, it is worth pointing out that the explanandum was chari-
table giving in the field, not a voluntary contribution to the public goods in the lab.
5Crowding out is predicted because when G becomes bigger by means of government grants, i
should now allocate more money to her own private good xi to maximize her overall utility. See
Becker (1974, Section 3.B, in particular footnote 34).
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disutility.6
Ui = xi − αmax[xj − xi, 0]− βmax[xi − xj, 0] (3)
In words, i ’s utility increases as her income does, but decreases when the ref-
erence person (j ) earns more than she does, factored by α, or less than she does,
factored by β. It is usually assumed that α > β, meaning that i ’s hatred of the
inequity whereby she earns less than j is stronger (due to envy) than her hatred of
the inequity whereby she earns more than j (due to guilt or pure altruism).
Another well-known model is that of reciprocal fairness (Rabin, 1993). The
psychological intuition behind it is that people like to reciprocate what they perceive
as kind behavior with a kind response, and what they perceive as unkind or mean
behavior with an unkind response. It thereby captures a belief-dependent preference,
which is distinct from the preference for equality of outcomes per se captured by
models such as that of Fehr et al. (1993). Rabin (1993) uses a technique called
psychological game theory to model this. The utility function is represented as
Ui(ai, bj, ci) = πi(ai, bj) + αf̃j(bj, ci) + αf̃j(bj, ci) · fi(ai, bj)
(4)
The first term πi(ai, bj) captures i’s monetary payoffs determined by her own
action (ai) given her belief about j’s action (bj); the second term αf̃j(bj, ci) captures
how much i care about j’s perceived kindness toward her, based on bj (her belief
about j’s action) and ci (her belief about j’s belief about her action); and the
third term αf̃j(bj, ci) · fi(ai, bj) captures i’s reciprocal preference as a product of
her perception of j’s kindness (the same as the second term) and her own kindness
(fi(ai, bj)), determined by ai (her own action) and bj (her belief about j’s action).
Finally, α represents how much i cares about j’s kindness and the importance of
reciprocation, relative to monetary payoffs. It is straightforward that you feel good
when others are nice to you (the second term), but the crucial mathematical trick in
this model is the third term, which is positive whenever you reciprocate (kind to kind
or mean to mean). i’s own kindness is determined by how much j receives relative
to a pre-determined fair point on the scale of maximum and minimum payoffs. For
example, if 50-50 is the fair point in an ultimatum game, i’s kindness is positive
whenever she offers more than that to j.
This model of reciprocal fairness defines a new equilibrium concept, fairness
equilibrium, in which players maximize the utilities defined above, and their beliefs
6The following equation is a two-person model to communicate the main idea, but the original
is a general n-person model.
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are correct about the behavior and beliefs of others, namely, ai = bj = ci (similarly
aj = bi = cj). Camerer (2003, 113, 116) summarizes a comparison of the three types
of models described above:
Altruism theories do not explain both negative and positive behavior
toward others without crudely changing the signs of coefficients exoge-
neously. [Comparing the inequality-aversion models and the reciprocal-
fairness models,] The reciprocity-based view is surely more psychologi-
cally correct because players do care about the intentions of other players
and unchosen paths. At the same time, inequality-aversion is easy to use
analytically because social utilities can just be substituted into cells of
a payoff matrix, or nodes of a tree, before doing standard equilibrium
analyses.
In this quote Camerer (2003) mentions two factors, in addition to empirical
success, that are relevant for the methodological evaluation of these other-regarding
preference models. One is psychological realism, and the other is ease in modeling.
But Camerer also suggests that models may not converge in the long run, noting
that ‘when the empirical dust settles, both approaches may prove useful in different
technical applications’ (Camerer, 2003, 113). Interestingly, this quote suggests a
sense in which economics is more like applied engineering science, rather than basic
behavioral science, which we will discuss later. Before going there, however, let us
discuss in the next subsection what Camerer misses in his assessment, namely the
problem of how to model norm-based behavior.
3.2 Norm-focused approaches
The problem of both models of social preferences is that the fairness reference points
that are crucial for inferring inequality or others’ intentions are exogenously given
(see Dhami, 2016, 439-440). In reality, however, what is fair depends on the context
in the sense that it gives players an appropriate notion of fairness at first, and
they play accordingly. Empirically, this is an under-determination problem: when
the economist observes some data and tries to estimate a model, should she adjust
parameters such as α and β, or the value of the fairness reference point? Where
does the latter come from? It is less problematic when the observer or experimenter
is confident that she is controlling for the reference point because she is an insider
to that population, but the problem is severe when she has to explain cross-cultural
variations in terms of what norms apply in what situation (Gurven, 2004, 225).
On a more abstract level, Dhami (2016, 963) summarizes the problem in the
following passage:
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Classical game theory is based on methodological individualism. By con-
trast, the epistemic conditions for a Nash equilibrium require common
priors and common knowledge, which appear to transcend personal char-
acteristics of individuals. Indeed, these constructs appear to depend on
social institutions that help align the beliefs and expectations of individ-
uals.
Note that refining Nash equilibrium as a fairness equilibrium as Rabin (1993)
does fails to address this problem: if anything, it exacerbates it in making the
epistemic conditions even more unrealistic.
With a view to reconciling this problem with a formalism of game theory, Gintis
(2009) proposes using correlated equilibrium in epistemic game theory7 explicitly to
incorporate the roles that social norms and conventions play in coordinating the
expectations and behavior of individuals. A figurative person called choreographer
moves first in an augmented game, giving recommendations as to what strategies
players should adopt. A correlated equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in that no
player can do any better than follow the choreographer’s recommendation, given
that the others do the same. Gintis assigns the role of choreographer to conventions
and social norms.
This conceptual move assumes the main task of social norms to be that of co-
ordinator in games with multiple equilibria, akin to the function of focal points
or salience (Schelling, 1960). However, social norms should play a more exten-
sive role than facilitating coordination if they are to explain empirical anomalies of
non-equilibrium play in, for example, mutual cooperation in finitely repeated social-
dilemma or public-good games, or other observations from two-person sequential
games.
In fact, Gintis (2017, chapters 6 and 10) proposes that a minority of human
populations have internalized ‘strong reciprocity,’ an altruistic trait of following
norms unconditionally and punishing violators at a personal cost. Although the
majority are self-regarding, the sufficient chance of encountering strong reciprocators
deters them from norm deviation, thus sustaining norm-following as an aggregate
stable phenomenon.
An alternative approach to modeling the extra-coordinative roles of social norms
in influencing aggregate behavior is to see them as self-sustaining or reinforcing
mechanisms of conditional preferences, as Bicchieri (2017, 35) notes:
A social norm is a rule of behavior such that individuals prefer to conform
to it on condition that they believe that (a) most people in their reference
network conform to it (empirical expectation), and (b) that most people
7Epistemic game theory models the structure of knowledge in normal form games by introducing
information, subjective priors and conjectures of players about which pure strategies others play.
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in their reference network believe they ought to conform to it (normative
expectation).
Whereas for Gintis the key mechanism is the minority’s unconditional (inter-
nalized) preference for compliance, for Bicchieri it is the majority’s preference for
compliance conditional on the majority’s compliance. Basic preferences for con-
forming to others’ empirical and normative expectations are presupposed (with in-
dividual differences), which is compatible with their having some evolutionary roots
and having been internalized through socialization, as Gintis theorizes about strong
reciprocity. However, such a preference is assumed to be common although weak, in
the sense that it influences behavior only in the event of widespread conformity and
normative expectations. Another difference is that Bicchieri’s model of conditional
preferences aims to explain and facilitate rapid societal behavioral changes, whereas
Gintis seems to be more interested in explaining how strong reciprocity plausibly
evolved over a much longer time-scale.8 In other words, Gintis’s model is located
more toward the bottom right-hand section in Table 1.
There are lively discussions about the empirical success of these models (see e.g.
Guala, 2012, and the related commentaries), but what is important to note here
is the common feature of both accounts, namely that they do not simply re-define
the objective functions of representative players, and solve the new game by means
of Nash or a modified equilibrium.9 Instead, both accounts explicitly hypothesize
how people exert influences on each others’ behavior. Gintis models the stability
of norm compliance as a consequence of having a mix of people with heterogeneous
preferences,10 whereas Bicchieri relies on belief-desire psychology and the related
networks (i’s behavior sends information about her beliefs and preferences to j,
who updates his beliefs and behavior, and so on) to model dynamic processes of
influence propagation in the aggregate. The level of conformism in this model is
allowed to vary within the population (i.e., different people may have different levels
of conformist preferences), but it is assumed to be stable for any given player. On
the other hand, influence propagation is mediated by belief rather than preference
changes. For example, compliance among hardline conformists could be perceived
as evidence of compliance by moderate conformists, who then conform, which could,
8For example, Gintis (2017, 242) discusses the population dynamics through which strong reci-
procity could have evolved by comparing a genetic-group selection model and a gene-culture co-
evolutionary model.
9Bicchieri (2006, Appendix of chapter 1) does this exercise in much the same way as the other
modelers of social preferences, but she does not seem to take it as central in her account.
10This is distinct from evolutionary game theory, in which strategies as behavioral phenotypes,
not human agents, play games and occupy evolutionary niches, for example tit-for-tat in the
repeated prisoner’s dilemma dominates the population through replicator dynamics, or different
strategies share portions in evolutionary equilibrium. Gintis’s claim is instead that norm-following
dominates behaviorally, but is backed-up by populations with different preferences and beliefs.
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in turn, be perceived as evidence of compliance by weak conformists, and so on until
even the weakest conformists are convinced that there is reason to comply. Norm-
following behavior could also unravel through this chain of influence propagation
in a similar way. The model also explains the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance,
according to which an unpopular norm (such as female genital cutting or college
binge drinking) that is unsupported according to people’s private preferences may
continue to be followed because people mistakenly perceive any observation of the
majority’s compliance as evidence of collective support.
3.3 Models of conditional preferences
Whereas Gintis assumes that norm-following preferences are intra-personally stable
as a result of evolutionary and cultural processes, recent models purport explicitly
to model the phenomenon according to which preferences are directly influenced or
conditioned by others’ preferences within a relatively short time scale. One could in-
terpret this as a general approach to conditional preferences that is compatible with
Bicchieri’s belief-desire model of preferences that are conditional on expectations.
Commenting on the type of social-preference models reviewed in Section 3.1, Stir-
ling and Felin (2013, 2) note that ‘the payoffs associated with these approaches are
explicitly categorical, and any sociality generated by these models remains a func-
tion of individual interests.’ The underlying criticism in this passage is sociological,
similar to Dhami’s (2016) claim that individual beliefs are a function of socialization.
In the words of Fershtman and Segal (2018, 127), the model has explicitly to focus
on ‘the formation of endogenous behavioral preferences that are subject to social
influence.’ The term social signifies two things. First, this approach is distinct from
evolutionary game theory, in which relative success or fitness is exogenously given
according to some survival standards, economic (monetary pay-offs) or evolutionary
(reproductive success). Second, one’s preferences are influenced not only by parents,
as in cultural transmission models, but also by other members of the social group.
In other words, this approach is located in the bottom-left section of Table 1, namely
within the core explanatory interests of economics.
Fershtman and Segal (2018) propose that individuals have two distinct utility
functions, ui representing their core preferences, and vi their behavioral preferences,
which are related as follows:
vi = fi(ui, v−i), (5)
where v−i represents the behavioral utility profile of n − 1 individuals in the
social group (everyone except i). In other words, i’s behavioral utility is influenced
by the behavioral utilities of other members and her own core utility, via some social
influence function fi. In particular, they impose a simplification on this function,
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namely that vi is a function of her core preferences and the average observed be-
havioral preferences of everyone else. This assumption simplifies the influence func-
tions as if there were only two persons, but at the same time it allows preference
distribution to have an impact on equilibrium behavioral preferences (behavioral
preferences after they have been influenced by each other). That is, individuals may
form different behavioral preferences by observing different subsets of all behavioral
preferences. On the basis of this and other assumptions, Fershtman and Segal (2018)
prove several things, such as the existence of a unique equilibrium in which behav-
ioral preferences are stable; that the influence propagation does not reverse the core
preference patterns (e.g. if i is more risk-averse than j at the core, then this order
is preserved in behavioral preferences after the influences have been exerted); and
that the influence does not make individuals more extreme (e.g. polarization does
not happen).
Given that the proposed model is still at the stage of conceptual formalization
and there are no empirical applications, it is difficult to evaluate it thoroughly.
For present purposes, however, it is worth noting that Fershtman and Segal (2018)
explicitly purport to model social influences upfront, while remaining neutral with
respect to psychological mechanism. Although they consider psychological and phys-
ical constraints on how sensitive individuals can be to changes in outcomes, they
explicitly refrain from supporting varying psychological concepts such as altruism,
reciprocity, and group identity. Moreover, they remain open as to the reason why
other people’s behavior affects one’s own behavior. In fact, even basic conformist
preference, which is a necessary assumption for Bicchieri and Gintis, is not assumed.
It is revealing in this respect that they claim their model can be applied to the anal-
ysis of committee deliberation: ‘The effect of deliberation can be captured by our
social influence procedure where each individual votes according to his behavioral
preferences which depend on his core preferences and the behavioral preferences of
committee members that participate in the deliberation. [...] Adopting our setup,
the different procedures may affect the formation of the behavioral preferences and
therefore the outcome of the committee’s vote.’ (Fershtman and Segal, 2018, 140)
Similar interests are salient in the model of conditional game theory (Stirling,
2012; Stirling and Felin, 2013; Hofmeyr and Ross, 2019; Ross and Stirling, 2020). For
example, the main concern of these theorists is not to move the study of preference
formulation to ‘the psychological and sociological headwaters of preference origina-
tion’ (Stirling and Felin, 2013, 2), but rather to provide a general framework that
is applicable to ‘a wide range of potential social contexts that feature extant social
relations and influence.’ Their motivating examples, such as strategic decisions by a
Board of Directors (Hofmeyr and Ross, 2019) and manager-employee relations (Stir-
ling and Felin, 2013), are thus similar to Fershtman and Segal’s (2018) committee
deliberation. Some context-specific social relations are already assumed in all these
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examples, but they are not tied to specific preferences coming from background as-
sumptions given by evolutionary or psychological theories. In other words, they are
compatible with heterogeneous explanations of social influences, such as that indi-
viduals ‘may like (or dislike, for that matter) the others involved, they may value
others’ opinions, or they may have an existing relationship with others (familial,
friendship or professional).’ (Stirling and Felin, 2013, 2)
The modeling approach of Stirling and others is rather different from that of
Fershtman and Segal (2018), however. Rather than assuming core and behavioral
preferences for each players, the assumption in conditional game theory is that pref-
erences may be categorical or conditional. The former are normal preferences as
assumed in classical game theory, whereas the latter are conditional on other play-
ers’ preferences. Suppose, for example, that there are two players, e (employee) and
m (manager), with two feasible actions for each, he, le and hm, lm, corresponding
respectively to high and low employee work effort and the monitoring efforts of the
manager. The players have preferences over the outcome space Ae×Am, which con-
tains four action profiles (he, hm), (he, lm), (le, hm), (le, lm). In classical game theory,
both e and m have categorical preference orderings, such as (le, lm) e (he, hm) e
(he, lm) e (le, hm) for e, and (he, lm) m (he, hm) m (le, hm) m (le, lm) for m.
In contrast, the influence m has on e is modeled in conditional game theory as e’s
conditional preference orderings: e entertains hypothetical propositions in the form
of ‘if m’s preference ordering is such and such, then e’s preference ordering is such
and such’, and so on. The antecedents of these hypothetical propositions are called
conjectures, and their consequents are conditional utilities. A conditional utility of
e is defined as
ue|m(·|ae) : Ae ×Am → R (6)
for each conjecture ae. Such utilities are non-negative and sum to unity, but no
more specific constraints are imposed on them based on psychological hypotheses.
On the contrary, this mathematical modeling framework is meant to be as general
as possible, while providing a way to model conditional preferences analogous to
conditional probabilities or beliefs in multivariate probability theory. Conditional
utilities have all the properties of probability mass functions. In addition, with
technical conditions (acyclicity and framing invariance11), conditional preference
11Framing invariance means that informationally equivalent but notationally different framings
of preference aggregation will result in the same joint preference ordering. Stirling and Felin (2013,
4) note that ‘The richness and variability of human behavior, however, make it impossible to impose
this condition without justification’, and justify it as a weaker condition than the assumption of
classical game theory that preferences are categorical (and therefore framing invariant). Acyclicity
means that influence flows must be unidirectional, e.g. it cannot be that m influences e, which in
turn influences m, leading to infinite regress. Ross and Stirling (2020) note that ‘In many social
settings, however, social relations are cyclic’, and extend the frame to accommodate cyclic network
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relations resemble a Bayesian network: a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with discrete
random variables as vertices and conditional utility mass functions as edges. A DAG
defines a model of preferential influences, which produces a unique set of ex post
categorical utilities.12 The game can be solved at this stage via standard solution
concepts such as Nash equilibrium.
One selling point of conditional game theory is that it can give a clear opera-
tional meaning to the idea of an emergent preference ordering for a group, distinct
from the preference orderings of the group members and based on the aggregation
theorem (Stirling and Felin, 2013). They interpret such a concordant utility—the
product of e’s conditional utility and m’s categorical utility, in our example—as a
‘representation of the social consistency of the group, in that it provides a measure
of the degree of severity of controversy.’ (Stirling and Felin, 2013, 5). Hofmeyr
and Ross (2019) contrast this way of approaching group-level preference to that of
Bacharach et al. (2006). Let us now turn to this approach.
3.4 Models of team preference and team reasoning
Team preference and team-reasoning models (Sugden, 1993, 2000; Bacharach et al.,
2006) were developed primarily to solve the puzzle of equilibrium selection in clas-
sical game theory. As noted above, despite the modeling of situations involving
players with other-regarding preferences, many games remain uniquely unresolv-
able because there are multiple equilibria. The so-called Hi-Lo game highlights this
problem after payoff transformations. It is a coordination game without conflicts
of interest in which there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, (hi, hj) and (li, lj),
the former being clearly preferred by both players. In itself, the strategic rational-
ity of best-reply reasoning—choose the action that maximizes one’s own expected
utility, given that others are doing the same—explains neither the observation that
by far the majority of subjects choose (hi, hj) in experiments, thereby succeeding
in more profitable coordination, nor the fact that most people intuit that (hi, hj) is
the rational solution. Instead, individual strategic rationality needs to be supple-
mented with some auxiliary assumption, such as that the Pareto-dominating profile
is a focal point that is either perceptually or normatively salient. According to
Bacharach et al. (2006), this reveals a grave limitation of best-reply reasoning as the
main theoretical assumption from which to derive solutions. Bacharach et al. (2006)
propose that people instead apply team-reasoning : people (i) identify themselves
as members of a team (group identification or we-framing), (ii) identify an action
profile that is best for the team, (iii) identify their part in (ii), and (iv) play their
structures.
12Just as Fershtman and Segal (2018) restrict the range of influences within the observable others,
Stirling and Felin (2013) introduce the idea of sociation to limit the number of the conjecture
profiles that the agent considers.
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part to achieve the team’s goal. This process includes agency transformation, in
contrast to the usual payoff transformation. In the Hi-Lo game, if both i and j
identify with a team that consists of the two players, the process of team reasoning
straightforwardly leads to (hi, hj) as the unique solution. Similarly, in the case of
the employee and the manager, if e and m identify themselves with a company unit
consisting of the two of them, an efficient scenario in which e exerts high working
effort without m’s high monitoring effort, that is, (he, lm), can be achieved.
Bacharach et al. (2006) found support for this theory in the literature on group
identification in the field of social psychology and on group-level selection in evo-
lutionary biology. However, they do not use these theories simply to motivate or
constrain the choice of a particular model of other-regarding preferences.13 What is
distinctive about their work is that the theory yields a hypothesis concerning the pro-
cess through which the configuration of individual preference orderings endogenously
activates group identification and team reasoning. Specifically, the interdependence
hypothesis states that ceteris paribus the salience of three features of a game makes
it more likely that the players adopt team reasoning. The first feature is common
interest, defined as the fact that players prefer outcome o′ (e.g.,(hi, hj)) to outcome
o (e.g.,(li, lj)); the second feature is co-power, the fact that o
′ can be brought about
only by an appropriate combination of their actions; and the third is the existence
of a Nash equilibrium that realizes o rather than o′, making the attainment of o′
unassured by their individualistic decision-making. The scope of the theory goes
beyond pure coordination games such as Hi-Lo because these features are shared in
mixed-motive coordination games and social-dilemma games,for example.
The hypothesis that individual preferences endogenously give rise to preference
(and agency) transformations captures the fact that players’ preferences are inter-
dependent, as well as the fact that it is operationally meaningful in the framework
of game theory to talk about group-level preferences. Similarly, in conditional game
theory a network of individual categorical and conditional preferences gives rise to
a group-level utility (concordant utility), from which the ex post preferences of each
player are extracted (through marginalization). A major difference, however, is that
conditional game theory uses classical solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium
to derive equilibria of the game after social influence has been exerted through a
preferential network, whereas models of team reasoning directly reject individual
best-reply reasoning, thereby rejecting the basic logic underlying these solution con-
cepts. This is more radical than the refinements of solution concepts such as fairness
equilibrium. Given their radical nature, models of team reasoning remains a rela-
tively unpopular approach among economists, although there is a sizable body of
literature, both empirical (Smerilli, 2012; Guala et al., 2013) and philosophical (Gold
13On the use of the idea of group identity in economic modeling, see Chen and Li (2009). This
is a variant of social-preferences model reviewed in Section 3.1.
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and Sugden, 2007; Guala, 2017a).14
4 Methodological comparisons
Having presented the four main approaches to modeling social influences in eco-
nomics, I now turn to some of their underlying methodological issues. The discus-
sion in the following two subsections roughly covers epistemic and practical issues,
respectively.
4.1 The domain of the models of socially influenced behav-
ior
First of all, how do these models relate to each other? In terms of the mode of
explanations, the models we have reviewed all seem to be located in the bottom-
right area of Table 1, namely economic explanations of aggregate-scale phenomena
on a relatively short time scale. The explananda of the models also largely overlap.
For example, they all target stylized findings from non-cooperative experimental
games as the main data against which their models are tested: cooperation in the
social-dilemma game, coordination in mixed-motive or pure coordination games, fair
offers in the ultimatum game, the dictator game, the trust game, and so on. Even
the less empirically tested models, such as conditional game theory, explicitly use
them as explanatory paradigm games (Hofmeyr and Ross, 2019; Stirling and Felin,
2013). Thus, they seem to compete in an empirical horse race in which not all of
them hold true.15 However, as we have seen in the quote from Camerer (2003) in
Section 3.1 above, the model convergence is not necessarily assumed. Of course,
this is unsurprising given the standard Kuhnian analysis of normal science: trade-
offs between different epistemic values may not be uniquely solvable. However, I’d
like to highlight a more specific factor here, which is how different models relate
to the other types of explanations, such as the psychological (proximate) and the
evolutionary (ultimate).
14On the philosophical level the meaning of group agency has been discussed in the context of
social ontology. One major focus on the experimental level has been on whether social influences
are exerted through changes in beliefs or changes in preference (e.g. Ellingsen et al., 2012). This
question is rooted in social psychology, which concerns the mechanisms of group identification
within the minimal-group paradigm (Jin and Yamagishi, 1997). Guala (2016) refers to team
reasoning as a type of simulation thinking : a special case of individualistic reasoning. This line
of research rejects best-reply as a model of interactive reasoning, without rejecting individualism.
See also Guala (2018).
15Of course, if people are heterogeneous more than one model of social preference in a particular
population can hold true at the same time, as explicitly assumed in the models of social norms I
have discussed.
16
How should economic explanations of socially influenced behavior relate to the
other types of explanations? First, it seems reasonable to demand that economic
models should not contradict or be incompatible with them. In other words, the
requirement of compatibility puts constraints on economic models. For example,
models of social preference replace the default self-regarding model with various
psychological hypotheses about what people care about, such as altruism, spite,
social comparison, and intentional reciprocity (mostly based on the theorists’ in-
tuitive psychology). Models of team reasoning draws more from the literature on
group identity in the field of social psychology. On the evolutionary front, Gintis’s
(2017) model of social norms, as well as Bacharach’s (2006) model of team reason-
ing, explicitly consider evolutionary explanations such as group-level selection and
gene-culture co-evolution as narrowing the range of preferences with which people
are plausibly endowed. From this perspective, one could evaluate these models in
terms of how well they cohere with explanations in other domains (interdisciplinary
coherence).
However, things are not so simple because economists can have different un-
derstandings about what is distinct about the domain of economic explanations,
vis-à-vis the other domains. I have already identified two points, a short time-scale
(relative to evolutionary and historical processes) and aggregate-level phenomena
(relative to individual psychological processes). Regarding the former, evolutionary
game theory (which abstracts from human choices and models the replicator dy-
namics of strategies) implicitly moves toward a longer timescale, thereby competing
less with other models.16 Regarding the latter, all the models discussed in Section 3
are models of aggregate phenomena in the sense that they focus on the solutions of
games among people with beliefs and preferences, categorical or conditional. How-
ever, different models seem to interpret this aggregation process differently. In the
view of Bacharach et al. (2006), for example, the logic of best reply is a psychological
hypothesis about human inference. This interpretation opens up the possibility to
propose alternatives, such as team reasoning and solution thinking that give rise
to aggregate-level phenomena. On the other hand, Hofmeyr and Ross (2019) and
Ross and Stirling (2020) explicitly (and Fershtman and Segal (2018) implicitly) re-
ject such a psychological interpretation of the strategic rationality of game theory.
Commenting on Bacharach et al. (2006), Hofmeyr and Ross (2019) note:
Game theory, like economics, is concerned with choices. If choice is
defined in terms of outputs of reasoning processes, it follows that an ac-
count of team agency must be an account of reasoning. [...] However,
in our view, a general theory of an aspect of agency, particularly eco-
16Sometimes the evolutionary approaches produce a psychological hypothesis positing that peo-
ple mistake one-shot interactions for repeated interactions in the ancestral life. Thus formulated,
this can be tested in experimental games.
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nomic agency, should reflect the more deflationary account of choice [...]
According to this deflationary view, a behavior is chosen just in case
it is subject to influence by incentives, regardless of whether the causal
channel that links incentives and behavior involves deliberation.
From this deflationary perspective, a general-purpose model compatible with a wide
range of psychological mechanisms—such as conditional game theory—is preferred.
Models of team reasoning, in contrast, imply interactions among typically symmet-
rical players who team-reason, which is a strong restriction on the domain of the
model, as well as on the mechanisms underlying choices. Similarly, models of so-
cial preference committed to particular psychological mechanisms are to be avoided,
not necessarily because they have more free parameters for curve-fitting (some, e.g.
Binmore and Shaked (2010) criticize these models as ad hoc for this reason), but
because they constrain economic modeling too much, unnecessarily narrowing down
its domain of applicability.17
Bicchieri’s (2006; 2017) theory of social norms is ambivalent in its commitment to
psychological mechanisms. On the one hand, the key constructs are belief-dependent
preferences, within the structure of belief-desire psychology, but on the other hand,
Biccchieri points out that the model should not be interpreted as a literal description
of real psychological processes. In particular, Bicchieri (2006, 56) emphasizes the
automatic way in which semantic priming activates a schema (or a script) that
provides the context with a structure comprising a set of actions, events, people
and their roles. This hypothesis relies heavily on the psychology of unmotivated
actions or efficient social cognition, implying that most norm-following behavior
is automatic. To reconcile these two aspects, Guala (2017b) interprets Bicchieri’s
theory as a kind of dual account in which two distinct psychological processes are
at work ensuring the continuation and resilience of norms. In contrast, Ross et al.
(forthcoming) show that conditional game theory can formally capture Bicchieri’s
theory of social norms by abstracting from the specifics of psychological processes.
How well do these models capture the aggregation processes of social influence?
The answer depends on the meaning of social. Models of social preference are
the most naive in identifying ‘social’ with ‘other-regarding,’ while assuming some
norm-reference point as exogenously and unproblematically given. Models of social
norms are more developed in explicitly referring to expectations shared by indi-
viduals and in modeling how they function as focal points or correlated equilibria.
17Being non-committal with respect to the psychology of choice does not mean that other disci-
plines play no role in debates in economics. In fact, Hofmeyr and Ross (2019) argue against team
reasoning, drawing on evidence from developmental psychology to the effect that human infants
(and possibly other primates) with limited reasoning capacities have a natural propensity to en-
gage in joint actions. In this case, psychology is invoked not to constrain economic models, but to
motivate keeping them more flexible.
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These approaches model social influence as a network of expectations among vari-
ably conformist individuals. In contrast, models of conditional and team preferences
hypothesize about endogenous processes through which configurations of individual
preferences give rise to aggregate-level preferences, which in turn affect individual
choices. Social influence is modeled as a network of preference change, with more or
less specification of psychological mechanisms (models of team reasoning focuses on
group identification, whereas conditional game theory remains neutral). With the
exception of social preference models, the ‘social’ refers to aggregate dynamics dis-
tinct from individual characteristics, and in this sense those models constructively
address the criticism that homo economicus is asocial, albeit in different ways.
4.2 Applications of the models of socially influenced behav-
ior
The discussion in this subection concerns two issues related to the practical use of
these models of socially influenced behavior, which is related but distinct from the
issue of explanatory domains above.
A natural question in this regard is whether and how these models can be used
to facilitate social change. For example, models of social norms suggest that rapid
social change is possible through intervention in people’s expectations, which are
more malleable than the psychological traits such as conformist preferences, which
are evolutionarily and developmentally more stable. A good example is the use of
Bicchieri’s model of social norms to demolish bad norms. Female genital cutting
(FGC), which is a severe violation of human rights, is prevalent in many African
countries. However, there is wide cross-country variety in the level of support for
the practice among women who are responsible for having their daughters’ genitals
cut. The prevalence rate of FGC in Mali, for example, is around 85 percent, and the
practice is supported by 76 percent of women aged between 15 and 49. In contrast,
the level of support in Sudan, where the practice is even more prevalent (close to
90%), is less than 25 percent (Bicchieri, 2017, 46, Table 1.3). The implication is
that FGC in Sudan is an unpopular norm sustained by pluralistic ignorance: the
majority’s private distaste for the practice is not observable, whereas its prevalence
convinces those in the majority that there are high expectations of conformity. Thus,
although FGC in Sudan might disappear relatively quickly if there were interventions
to make those private preferences public, the practice in Mali will not change unless
preferences are targeted more directly.
Undesirable equilibria include not only severe violations of human rights, but also
socially tolerated behavior with substantial negative externalities, such as the unsus-
tainable consumption of private goods or the violation of social distancing during a
pandemic. Although the initial literature on nudging predominantly focused on pro-
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moting individual well-being, drawing on behavioral models of individual decision-
making, the prospect of nudging pro-social behavior, such as pro-environmental
action, has recently been the subject of lively discussion in interdisciplinary journals
(e.g., Schubert, 2017; Davis et al., 2018; Centola et al., 2018; Maki et al., 2019;
Hagmann et al., 2019; Capraro et al., 2019; Otto et al., 2020; Kristal and Whillans,
2020). Models of socially influenced behavior could contribute to this effort by
providing policymakers with recipes for behavioral change. If these models are ex-
pected to identify the right buttons to press for systemic and sustainable behavioral
change, they have to correctly identify the key mechanisms that drive change and
sustain desirable states, on both the individual-psychological and aggregate-social
levels. Models of team reasoning have not been used as systematically as models of
social norms, but they have a similar potential for application to behavioral change,
particularly in contexts in which group identity or strong interdependence is salient
(Nagatsu, 2015). Models of conditional preference have not yet been applied, but
they could be useful if they could be operationalized and measured, and were to
intervene on the level of sociation, that is the subset of others whose preferences
matter in terms of the range of conjecture or observable behavioral preferences.
Models of social preferences are also used to plan a specific type of social change
through the mechanism design of marketplaces. Bolton and Ockenfels (2012), for
instance, considered the optimal design of online marketplaces. They found that
buyers and sellers in an online second-hand commodity market showed a preference
for reciprocal favor when writing reviews. In other words, a typical user writes an
inflationary positive review about the other party anticipating reciprocation. The
result is reciprocal equilibrium in which positive reviews dominate the platform.
One way of evaluating the situation is to suggest that the welfare of the participants
improves as a result of their reciprocal preference satisfaction, as a matter of defini-
tion or as a matter of feel-good psychology. However, Bolton and Ockenfels (2012)
consider this to be a suboptimal situation that behavioral economic engineering
should modify, because the reciprocal behavior decreases the quality of information
about the reliability of the market participants, ultimately hurting them all and
deterring potential participants from entering.18 In contrast, in the design of the
non-market-based voluntary provision of public goods, or common resource man-
agement, Gintis’s model of cooperation for example suggests the importance of a
critical proportion of strong reciprocators to ensure the efficient provision of public
goods.
This comparison leads to another practical question: how should models of so-
cial interaction be used for welfare evaluation? In general, policy interventions
18Airbnb.com, for example, addresses this problem by forcing hosts and guests to review each
other in a simultaneous-move game, in which you cannot see the other party’s reviews on you until
you have submitted your own.
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in collective social behavior cannot beg the question of welfare judgement. The
assumption in traditional welfare economics is that standard preferences capture
everything economic agents care about, whatever they may be, which should be re-
spected. It is suggested in the above case, on the other hand, that economists have
more of a system-level approach in asking whether social preferences deserve the
policy-makers’ respect. They should be dampened sometimes, to safeguard efficient
information flow in the marketplace, but they should be exploited other times, to
facilitate the efficient provision of public goods.
Models of social preference as such seem unable to give a principled answer to
the ethical questions about how much and which social preferences deserve respect.
First, on the empirical level it seems difficult to find a universal social-utility func-
tion that accommodates all the data from different experimental games. Second
and more fundamentally, models of social norms and conditional preferences imply
that observed preferences are path-dependent and interdependent in many social
contexts. In other words, such preferences are endogenously created in networks
of social influences in a given environment. One cannot base welfare analysis of a
system on social preferences if the latter is a function of the former.
An analogy with models of individual judgement and decision-making may be
useful here. In the context of evaluating Prospect Theory as a behavioral alterna-
tive to the received Expected Utility Theory (EUT), Ross (2014) argues that the
former will not supplant the latter. This assessment is based on the reasoning that
there is no such thing as an ultimate theory of bounded rationality—be it Prospect
Theory or some new alternative—because the economic rational agency with tran-
sitive and consistent preferences that EUT models is in itself emergent, scaffolded
by the market by means of institutional and technological artefactual arrangements.
Similarly, one could argue that it is impossible to find the ultimate theory of so-
cial preferences because preferences—be they self-regarding or other-regarding—are
emergent in particular historical and institutional contexts. There is evidence from
cross-cultural studies, for example, that preferences for cooperative and fair play in
a range of two-person experimental games strongly correlate with the level of market
integration in a given society (Henrich, 2004), and that preferences for hierarchical
group dominance and institutionalized group-level discrimination (e.g., racism and
sexism) are interdependent (Kunst et al., 2017). Sociologists have long pointed out
that economic rational agency (with a self-interested calculus) is a product of the
market-centered modern society, but the models of conditional preferences suggest
that preferences are constructed in general : preferences for fairness and discrimina-
tion also seem to be a product of sociality.
If this analogy holds, in other words, if social arrangements cause more or less
stable social preferences, how should one go about making welfare evaluations of
social arrangements or institutional designs? Yet, none of the models of socially
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influenced behavior reviewed in this chapter in themselves provide an unambiguous
ethical framework. The literature on the ethical permissibility of social nudging
based on these models cannot address the question either, because it takes asocial,
autonomous individuals as the starting point of normative analysis. A pragmatic
alternative is to judge what is reasonable case-by-case, focusing mostly on the local
goals of specific marketplaces, such as online auction and matching platforms. How-
ever, some theorists have addressed the general normative question concerning the
desirability of market economies (e.g. Gui and Sugden, 2005; Bowles, 2016; Ross,
2013).
5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have reviewed four distinct approaches to the economic modeling
of socially influenced behavior, namely in terms of social preferences, social norms,
conditional preferences, and team reasoning. I have put particular emphasis on
their distinct methodological approaches to modeling social influence. In particular,
I showed that these approaches differ not only in empirical and technical detail,
but also in the interpretation of sociality in economic explanations. Some models
(of social preference and team reasoning) interpret human sociality as biological
or psychological constraints on the characteristics of preferences or the process of
preference formation, whereas others (models of conditional preference and to some
extent models of social norms) interpret it as contingent and interactive processes
of the formation of aggregate expectations and preferences. As such, the latter
approach addresses the asocial criticism of homo economicus in a more fundamental
way than the former. Put differently, in the framework of Calcott’s table (Table 1),
the latter is conscious about the distinct features of economic explanations as non-
reductive (as opposed to psychological proximate explanations) and constructive (as
opposed to biological ultimate explanations). In this sense, economic explanations
largely overlap with what we understand as sociological ones, although the former
is usually associated with social engineering and management, whereas the latter
with social critique.
Where should philosophers of economics go from these observations? Let me
conclude by briefly speculating on two possible directions. One is a practical turn,
involving broadening the methodological analysis of economic experimentation and
modeling to incorporate their wider social (and economic!) conditions and aspira-
tions. In particular, the narrow focus of methodologists on the epistemic success of
models and experiments and their extrapolation could be widened to include assess-
ment of the more constructive use of experimental and modeling tools in applied
contexts (e.g., Redpath et al., 2018). The second is a normative turn, which seems
necessary to properly evaluate the welfare implications of social arrangements which
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themselves affect social preferences. This could be called the ethics of institutional
design, but standard normative ethics, including the utilitarianism underlying wel-
fare economics, is insufficient to the extent that it assumes stable preferences as
given prior to social influence. Instead, something like what Slaby (2016) calls
a political philosophy of mind—the reflective and systematic assessment of social
arrangements—seems inevitable once the domain of economics is understood as dis-
tinctly social.
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